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According to Risse and Zeckhauser, racial profiling can be justified in a society, such as 
the contemporary United States, where the legacy of slavery and segregation is found in lesser 
but, nontheless, troubling forms of racial inequality.1 Racial profiling, Risse and Zeckhauser 
recognize, is often marked by police abuse and the harassment of racial minorities, and by the 
disproportionate use of race in profiling.  These, on their view, are unjustified.  But, they 
contend, this does not mean that all forms of racial profiling are unjustified; nor, they claim, 
need one be indifferent to the harms of racism in order to justify racial profiling.  In fact, one of 
the aims of their paper is to show that racial profiling, suitably understood, “is consistent with 
support for far-reaching measures to decrease racial inequities and inequality” (134).  Hence, 
one of their most striking claims, in an original and provocative paper, is that one can endorse 
racial profiling without being in any way indifferent to the disadvantaged status of racial 
minorities.  
 
 In an initial response to these claims, I argued that Risse and Zeckhauser tend to 
underestimate the harms of racial profiling.2  I suggested two main reasons why they did so.  
The first is that they tend to identify the more serious harms associated with profiling with 
background racism, and therefore to believe that these are not properly attributable to profiling 
itself.  The second reason is that they ignore the ways in which background racism makes even 
relatively minor harms harder to bear and to justify than would otherwise be the case. Hence, I 
concluded, racial profiling cannot be a normal part of police practice in a society still struggling 
with racism, although under very special conditions, and with special regulation and 
compensation in place, it might be justified as an extraordinary police measure.  
 
                                                 
I would like to thank the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association for inviting me to 
participate on this panel.  I would also like to thank my fellow panelists, Mathias Risse and Michael Levin, 
for their comments.  They have forced me to think far more deeply about racial profiling than I could have 
anticipated in 2005, when a talk by Mathias first got me thinking about the subject.  Finally, I am grateful 
to Shepley Orr, David Grusky and David Garland for suggestions about what to read on race and crime, 
and to Robert J. Sampson for pointing me to the relevant parts of his considerable oeuvre.  
 
 
1 Mathias Risse and Richard Zeckhauser, “Racial profiling,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 32.2 (2004): 
131 – 70.  All references to Risse and Zeckhauser are to this article.  
2 Annabelle Lever, “Why Racial profiling is Hard to Justify: A Response to Risse and Zeckhauser”, PAPA 
33.1. (2005): 94 – 110. 
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 I want to stand by those claims.  However, Risse’s response to my arguments, here, 
persuades me that I misinterpreted his earlier position in one significant respect.3  So, I will start 
by explaining what interpretive mistake I believe that I made.  I will then argue that despite 
Risse’s patient and careful response to my arguments, my initial concerns with his justification 
of profiling remain valid.   
 
Some Terminology 
  
 Before getting under way, however, it might be helpful to recapitulate some 
terminology.  The first is about racial profiling.  I am happy to accept Risse and Zeckhauser’s 
definition of it as “any police-initiated action that relies on the race, ethnicity, or national origin 
and not merely on the behavior of an individual”. (136 RZ)  As they say, there are several 
different forms of profiling, so described.  The two main ones are what I will call post-crime 
profiling and prospective or preventative profiling.  It is the latter that is the most controversial, 
and that is the focus of both our papers.  Whereas post-crime profiling departs from a 
witnesses’ description, however vague, of a suspect who has actually committed a crime, 
preventative profiling creates a profile based on statistical evidence of who is likely to commit a 
crime, and then uses this to initiate police stops and searches.  Its aims, therefore, are to 
prevent crime - if possible by catching criminals before they are actually able to carry out their 
nefarious plans.   
 
 This form of profiling is controversial because we generally suppose that the police are 
only entitled to stop and search people whose behaviour supports the belief that they have 
committed, or are about to commit, a crime. The preemptive aspects of profiling seem to 
threaten that principle, and thus to justify what, in American constitutional jargon, would be 
called “a warrantless search”.4 In addition to these general worries about prospective profiling, 
however, there are worries specific to racial profiling.  Those worries, quite simply, are that 
                                                 
3 Mathias Risse, “Racial profiling: A Reply to Two Critics”.  All references to Risse are to this article.  
4 Relevant Supreme Court decisions in this area include Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Almeida-Sanchez 
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, (1975); United 
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).                                     
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profiling based on racial characteristics (as popularly understood),5 exacerbates racism in 
society, and is likely to lead to the abuse and harassment of racial minorities.  
 
  Risse and Zeckhauser note that there would be no controversy over racial profiling 
were it not possible that it is a useful way to combat crime.  Statistics suggest that black people 
commit a disproportionate number of crimes in our societies.6 So, while there are reasons for 
supposing that racial profiling is unjustified – given general problems with profiling, and those 
specific to racial profiling itself – it is not clear that it is always unjustified, as we also have some 
reason to think it might be a useful way of reducing serious threats to people’s lives, liberties 
and property.  At all events, as Risse and Zeckhauser note, while these assumptions are 
controversial, it is only if there are significant race-based disparities in crime, and if there is 
some reason to think racial profiling an effective way to tackle these, that there is any reason to 
consider whether or not such profiling is justified (RZ 132). 
 
  The second piece of terminology is the definition of an expressive harm. According to 
Risse and Zeckhauser, the harms of racial profiling are largely expressive.  We can call this the 
Expressive Harm Thesis: the EHT for short.  The EHT, as applied to racial profiling, holds that the 
bulk of the harms of racial profiling are not due to profiling per se, but to the context in which 
that profiling occurs: namely, a context in which racism, and its legacy, continues to 
disadvantage black people relative to white. (RZ 144, 146)  The harms of racial profiling, then, 
are largely attributable to background racism/racial inequality, according to the EHT, and not to 
racial profiling itself. The EHT is a causal thesis, which claims that the harms of profiling are 
generally caused by factors other than racial profiling. Its implication is that the harms peculiar 
to racial profiling are smaller than one might have supposed and, consequently, that it may be 
easier to justify racial profiling than one might have expected. (Risse, 16) 
                                                 
5 For the argument that race, as popularly understood, has no scientific basis, see Kwame Anthony Appiah, 
“How to Decide if Races Exist”, The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 106, (May 2006), pp. 
363-380. 
6 Steve Holbert and Lisa Rose, The Color of Guilt and Innocence: Racial profiling and Police Practices in 
America, (Page Marque Press, California, 2004).  At p. 126 Holbert and Rose give these figures for arrest 
(though, obviously, not conviction) rates for 2000: Black people made up 12% of the population but 56% 
of those arrested for murder; 42% of those arrested for rape; 61% of those arrested for robbery; 39% of 
those arrested for aggravated assault; 31% of those arrested for burglary; 33% of those arrested for larceny 
and 40% of those arrested for motor vehicle theft.  However, they note that recent studies indicate that 
black people and Latinos are no more likely than whites to possess narcotics or contraband, although, for 
reasons that they discuss, they may be caught at a higher rate than white people.  
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 My Mistake 
 
 Now, my mistake was to suppose that the purpose of the expressive harm thesis was 
not simply to help us to identify the harms specific to racial profiling, as we obviously have to do 
if we are to consider whether or not they are justified.  I had thought that the EHT was also 
supposed to distance racial profiling from racism.  In separating out the harms of profiling into 
those attributable to profiling itself, and those attributable to background racism, I had thought 
that Risse and Zeckhauser were implying, and meant to imply, that racial profiling was not itself 
racist.  Consequently, I assumed that it would be an objection to their arguments if one could 
show that racial profiling was, quite plausibly, an example of racist ideas and habits.  So, I set out 
to show why one might think that racial profiling was a form of racism, and how looking at it this 
way helped to explain why - as I also argued -  such profiling was as likely to exacerbate, as to 
reflect, any background racism in society (Lever, 96- 97).  
 
 As Risse says, I was wrong to suppose that their justification of profiling depended on 
drawing a sharp line between racial profiling on the one hand, and racism on the other (Risse, 
22) Indeed, as Risse notes, I had unfortunately overlooked the significance of a passage in which 
they had tried to make precisely this point (152). Thus, according to Risse and Zeckhauser even if 
racial profiling is itself a form of racism, indeed, even if it “partly, and perhaps even largely, 
constitutes the racist reality of the United States”7 it is possible that its harms are expressive – ie 
due to forms of background racism unrelated to racial profiling itself. 8 
                                                 
7 Risse and Zeckhauser, here, are stating what they take to be an objection to their views, namely, that 
profiling is an important, perhaps a preeminent, form of racial discrimination and oppression in the 
contemporary USA. 
8 Considerations of space and clarity preclude dealing with Risse’s response to my discussions of torture 
and flashing (Risse, pp. 20-22) in the body of this paper.  Risse is sure that the harms of torture are not 
significantly expressive, i.e. caused by other harms such as sexism, or anti-Semitism, operating via torture.  
I suppose I’m just not as confident about this as he, in part because torture is generally a rather lengthy, 
staged process, rather than a single event, and its harms are likely to be multiple, as well as cumulative.  I 
think some of that complexity – and therefore the difficulty I see in too sharp a distinction between 
expressive and non-expressive harms - is brought out by an example that Timmerman mentions: that of a 
non-Jewish woman who was led to believe that she was being tortured partly because she was Jewish, and 
so was vainly protesting her non-Jewish status.  As Timmerman wondered, what could a Jewish woman say 
in those circumstances?  And how, too, should we understand the harms if we consider the non-Jewish 
woman either to be anti-Semitic, or deeply opposed to anti-Semitism?  
 Clearly background anti-Semitism is going to cause different harms, via torture, in these different 
cases; and the harms of torture are likely predicated both on the Jewish/non-Jewish status of the victim, and 
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  This, presumably, is how Risse and Zeckhauser want us to think about any problems of 
police abuse, on the one hand, or the disproportionate use of race in policing, on the other – 
although they never explicitly say that we should think of these as examples of expressive 
harm.9  Both may well reflect background racism in society, rather than just the idiosyncratic 
proclivities of certain policemen.  But, even if there is a systemic quality to police abuse and to 
the use of race, Risse and Zeckhauser imply, it does not follow that racial profiling is unjustified, 
even though it will then be likely that police abuse and the misuse of race in policing will infect 
racial profiling.  These systematic harms, if they were to occur, would be the result of 
background racism, and not harms specific to profiling.  One can, therefore, support racial 
profiling while deploring police abuse, and supporting training, supervision and punishment in 
order to combat the latter. (RZ 139) My mistake, then, was to suppose that Risse and 
Zeckhauser’s justification of profiling turned on the assumption that racial profiling is not, itself, 
an expression of racist habits of thought and police practice.  It does not: because how far one 
divides up the different harms of profiling into expressive and profiling-specific categories is not 
resolved by deciding whether or not profiling itself is a form of racism.  
 
 Now, at the risk of compounding my error, I would like to say that this mistake was, in 
some ways, a natural one.  That is, it is an easy mistake to make once you bear in mind Risse and 
Zeckhauser’s ambition to justify racial profiling while showing due concern about racial 
inequalities and injustice.  It is an important aspect of their argument that their justification of 
racial profiling is consistent with support for affirmative action and significant efforts to alleviate 
                                                                                                                                                 
on the attitude of the victim towards that status prior to torture.  So, I am genuinely unsure how far the 
expressive/non-expressive distinction is going to help us here, and suspect that it remains a difficult 
distinction to draw in many cases.   See Timmerman, …..;  For an illuminating philosophical account of the 
harms of torture, that discuss the interrogational situation in considerable depth, see David Sussman, 
“What’s Wrong with Torture?”, PAPA, Vol. 33 No. 1, (Jan. 2005).  
  I am also sceptical about how far the idea of an expressive harm illuminates the ( causes of the) 
fear that flashing so often creates.  After all, symbols even of horrendous acts, do not generally cause fear 
themselves, unless intended to do so; and fear is but one of a range of responses to the piling up of 
disadvantage, which include resentment, acquiescence and rebellion.  So, it is not altogether clear that 
treating flashing as a “focal point” for sexism illuminates (the causes of) the harm of flashing, as the EHT 
implies, even if it is clear that the harms of flashing presuppose some specific forms of sexual oppression 
and subordination as background.  My worry, I suppose, is that the EHT does little to distinguish one harm 
from another, and therefore to clarify the causes specific to particular harms, or to illuminate the reasons 
why a harm, such as sexism or even flashing, is likely to have various forms, whose differences are often of 
the utmost moral and political importance.   
9 RZ p.139, and footnote 12 on p. 139 make the argument that “police abuse and profiling as we define it 
are different problems that must be assessed independently and that have different remedies”. 
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racial injustice. But if racial profiling is itself an example of racism, let alone a significant form of 
racism in a society, it is hard to see how this can be so.   The EHT, if true, as they claim, means 
that most of the harms of racial profiling are attributable to background racism rather than to 
profiling itself.  But why should that matter if one cares about racial justice? Indeed, why should 
the truth of the EHT, if it is true, outweigh the fact that racial profiling is a form of racism?   
 
 As the Supreme Court says, repeatedly, the protection of basic rights and liberties places 
significant constraints on the ways in which we can promote security, and other legitimate 
government objectives.10  It means, they emphasise, that we cannot always make use of the 
most efficient way to catch and punish crime. So, it seems fair to ask, if in other contexts racial 
equality prevents us choosing the most efficient way to prevent crime, why doesn’t it prevent us 
choosing racial profiling over other forms of policing, even if racial profiling is more efficient 
than the alternatives? 
 
 Risse has a response to that question which I will consider in a moment.  The point, for 
now, is simply to highlight the incongruity of supposing both that racial profiling is a form of 
racism and that it is, nonetheless, justified  - at least if one cares about racial equality.  This 
incongruity, obviously, explains part of the appeal or challenge of Risse’s ideas, and of the 
original paper by Risse and Zeckhauser.  But it also explains, I think, why the mistake I made was 
a natural one: because justifying a practice that one considers an example of racism is a strange 
way to promote racial justice.  
 
 Two ideas are essential to Risse and Zeckhauser’s arguments for profiling, and figure in 
Risse’s response to my criticisms.  The first is that profiling by race may, in some circumstances, 
serve a genuinely important purpose better than the alternatives: namely, the reduction of 
serious crime. (footnote 28, 152 emphasises the point; and Risse, 28)  Moreover, because most 
crime is intra-racial, rather than inter-racial, black people can be expected to benefit 
                                                 
10 For a classic, and much-quoted version of this theme see Part II of Stewart’s Majority decision in 
Almeida-Sanchez v. US, 413 U.S. 266 (1973): “The needs of law enforcement stand in constant tension 
with the Constitution’s protections of the individual against certain exercises of official power.  It is 
precisely the predictability of these pressures that counsels a resolute loyalty to constitutional safeguards”.  
It is, however, an open question how far that “resolute loyalty” can be discerned in more recent cases such 
as Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985);  and National 
Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
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significantly from racial profiling, although white people too, will probably benefit, but without 
directly bearing any of the costs of profiling. Secondly, it is possible, as the EHT claims, that the 
harms of profiling are largely attributable to factors other than profiling itself.  So, even if racial 
profiling is a form of racism, even if it is a significant form of racism, sensitivity to the victims of 
crime, and not just to the victims of profiling, tells against dismissing racial profiling out of hand 
as racist and therefore unjustified.  As Risse puts it: “Our argument that profiling might be 
justified requires that other people would have a complaint if we did not strive strongly to 
reduce crime” (Risse, 28). 
 
 I have some sympathy for this response, because I don’t want to close the door on the 
idea that there might be racially beneficial consequences to profiling.  Still, I remain skeptical 
about our ability to reconcile racial justice with the justification of a practice that might, itself, 
be an example - and even an exemplar - of racism. In that sense, I am not persuaded that the 
EHT can reconcile support for racial profiling with support for affirmative action if racial profiling 
is, indeed, an example of racism.  I do not ignore the fact – or what seems to be a fact – that 
black people are, disproportionately likely to be victims of violent crime.  On the contrary, if one 
is seriously concerned about this fact, one would want police efforts to focus on black people as 
potential victims, rather than potential perpetrators of crime – or so it seems to me. 11  
 
 In short, while racial profiling, as usually practiced, may benefit black people by 
decreasing black-on-black crime, this is not (usually) its purpose, and this beneficial effect may 
be incidental to goals that are, rather, likely to make the residents of white neighbourhoods feel 
secure, than to decrease the battles over drugs and turf that plague their black counterparts. So, 
racial profiling is unlikely to be an efficient use of police resources if one wants to reduce crime 
for those people who are most likely to be its victims: namely, black people living in inner-city 
                                                 
11 Robert J. Sampson and William Julius Wilson cite the following figures on blacks as victims of violent 
crime: the leading cause of death among young black males is homicide; the lifetime risk of being 
murdered is as high as 1 in 21 for black males, compared to 1 in 131 for white males.  Whereas the death 
rate from firearms amongst young black males more than doubled from 1984 – 1988, they remained stable 
for young white males.  Hence, it has been estimated that a resident of rural Bangladesh has a greater 
chance of surviving to age 40 than does a black male in Harlem.  Admittedly, these chilling statistics may 
now be a bit out of date, but they give some idea of the magnitude of the problem. See Robert J. Sampson 
and William Julius Wilson, “Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality”, ch. 2 in Crime and 
Inequality (eds) J. Hagan and R. D. Peterson, (Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995) pp. 37-54.  
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neighbourhoods. 12  In any case, whether or not one supposes that police efforts should be 
concentrated in this way – and that, obviously, is not self-evident – it remains unclear that racial 
sensitivity and racial profiling can be reconciled if, as Risse and Zeckhauser allow, the latter can, 
itself, exemplify racial prejudice, suspicion and injustice.  
 
 The Expressive Harm Thesis 
 
 It is now time to look at the EHT directly.  In my original article, I argued that Risse and 
Zeckhauser tended to focus on the ways that racial profiling might reflect social injustice at the 
expense of the ways in which it might contribute to that injustice. I want briefly to recapitulate 
those points which, I believe, remain valid, although their original expression may have been 
misleading.   
 
 If racism has a systemic quality, rather than being a series of somewhat random acts, 
encounters and events, we should expect the harms of racial profiling to reflect the legacies of 
racism in society at large, as Risse and Zeckhauser suggest.  But the reverse is also true; that we 
should expect racial profiling to exacerbate racism in society at large, even in apparently 
unrelated areas such as housing, transport, employment and entertainment.  
 
  This seems to be the case.  Racial profiling encourages us to see black people as 
perpetrators, rather than victims of crime; and it encourages us to believe that ‘the face of 
crime’ is black13 although, for obvious reasons, white people are the majority of criminals in a 
                                                 
12 As RISSE AND ZECKHAUSER note, the situations where profiling seems useful are ones in which 
“investigators must make quick decisions about (say) whom to search, or in which large numbers of people 
are involved; in most other areas a strong case will be available for using (much) additional information 
about individuals” (p.135).  In fact, a recent article on racial disparities in crime concludes that “generic 
interventions to improve neighbourhood conditions may reduce the racial gap in violence.  Policies such as 
housing vouchers to aid the poor in securing residence in middle-class neighborhoods may achieve the 
most effective results…Policies to increase home ownership and hence stability of residence may also 
reduce disparities”.  So too, the authors suggest, would labour-market support for stable marriages amongst 
the poor.  The reason is that their research showed that while ‘the odds of perpetrating violence were 85% 
higher for Blacks compared with Whites…the majority of the Black-White gap (over 60%) and the entire 
Latino-White gap [10% less violence amongst Latinos than Whites] were explained primarily by the 
marital status of parents, immigrant generation, and dimensions of neighborhood social context”.  See, 
Robert J. Sampson, Jeffrey D. Morenoff, and Stephen Raudenbush, “Social Anatomy of  Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Violence” in American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 95, No. 2, (Feb. 2005). 
13 Harris, Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work, (New Press, New York, 2003), on “the 
face of crime”, p.169 
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society that is overwhelmingly white.  Racial profiling likely discourages black people from living, 
traveling and working in white neighbourhoods, especially at night, and so compounds 
residential and occupational segregation.  It likely discourages black people from joining the 
police, and so perpetuates a damaging public perception of the police as hostile to black people.  
Racial profiling likely obscures the fact that most violence is intra-racial, rather than inter-racial 
and committed by a minority of people, whatever their colour.  Indeed, Holbert and Rose claim 
that only 2% of black people are arrested for committing any crime in a given year (Holbert and 
Rose, 126).   
 
 This figure seems to be in line with other findings.  For example, in their studies of 
violence in 180 Chicago neighbourhoods from 1995-2002 Sampson et al. found that “Although 
3431 violent offenses were reported, personal violence is still relatively rare overall, with the 
prevalence of robbery (0.3%), purse snatching (0.3%), arson 90.4%), attacking with a weapon 
(2.3%), and gang fighting (3.9%) all less than 5% averaged across the 3 waves of data collection.  
Even the most common item, hitting someone (18.7%) is reported by fewer than 20% of 
subjects.  Carrying a hidden weapon (7.6%) and throwing objects at another person (8.2%) are in 
the middle.  These prevalence estimates comport with national norms”.14   In short, while there 
is undoubtedly a serious racial imbalance in violence and crime more generally, it is important to 
remember that its perpetrators are a small minority of their respective racial and ethnic groups.  
 
 Moreover, it seems likely that racial profiling fosters white complacency about the 
causes of crime – as it encourages white people to suppose that it is not their problem, and has 
nothing to do with the choices they make, personally or politically.  Yet, much violent crime in 
America is connected to the battle to supply and control the market for cocaine – a 
predominantly white, upper class drug –and with struggles over the control of prostitution and 
of gambling. Furthermore, as Sampson and Wilson show, public policy has an important role to 
play in explaining the extraordinary explosion of crime amongst young black men in the 1980s. 
Thus, lax enforcement of city housing codes, and the withdrawal of municipal services for public 
health and fire-safety exacerbated inner-city decay, despair and abandonment - or the 
                                                 
14 Sampson et al.  pp. 227-8 
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structural determinants of crime.15 So, there are good reasons to suspect that the choice of 
racial profiling, as a way to prevent and control crime, contributes to racism quite as much as it 
reflects it, by diverting attention from the structural, rather than the individual causes of crime; 
and from the differences these make to the crime rates of all groups, as well as to the rates of 
black violence within the United States. (Sampson and Wilson, 4). 
  
 The plausibility of the EHT, according to R, rests on two things.  First, that police abuse 
and the disproportionate use of race in policing would likely exist whether or not racial profiling 
was legal, and so cannot be attributed to profiling per se. ( R, 22- 23; RZ, footnote 12, p. 139) By 
contrast, you could get rid of racial profiling tomorrow, but most forms of racism would still 
remain to be tackled.   The second claim on behalf of the EHT, is that white people are unlikely 
to object to being profiled, and this shows that it is not profiling per se, but racism, that 
accounts for most of the harms attributed to racial profiling ( Risse, 22; RZ, 146, 148). 
 
 It is undoubtedly true that both police abuse and racial injustice more generally, would 
not vanish just because racial profiling were unequivocally judged to be illegal.  Indeed, it is 
likely that racial profiling would continue tacitly and illegally.  However, it does not follow from 
this that the harms of profiling are predominantly due to background racism. For instance, it 
seems just as likely that racial profiling exacerbates problems of police abuse, rather than 
merely reflecting whatever problems there are in the police already.  Racial profiling essentially 
provides the message that black people are so dangerous that the police are justified in stopping 
and searching them at their own discretion.  However, we generally believe that police 
discretion in these matters needs to be carefully circumscribed to protect the lives, liberties and 
rights of citizens, however much we admire or trust our police.16  So, it would not surprise me if 
                                                 
15 The figures on housing loss and destruction amongst black urban communities are astounding.  “In 
Atlanta one in six residents were dislocated by urban renewal; the great majority of these were poor blacks.  
Nationwide, fully 20 percent of all central-city housing units occupied by blacks were lost in the period 
1960-70 alone….this displacement does not even include that brought about by more routine market forces 
(evictions, rent increases, commercial development)”.  Moreover, “the negative consequences of deliberate 
policy decisions to concentrate minorities and the poor in public housing” have led to “massive, segregated 
housing projects that have become ghettos for the minorities and disadvantaged….public housing is a 
federally funded, physically permanent institution for the isolation of black families by race and class”. 
Sampson and Wilson, p. 43.  Thus, while one of every five poor blacks lived in ghettos or areas of extreme 
poverty in 1970, by 1980 nearly two out of every five did so.  (p.42) 
16 John Kleinig (ed), Handled With Discretion: Ethical Issues in Police Decisionmaking, (Rowman and 
Littlefield, New York, 1996), pp.1-13  
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profiling itself exacerbates whatever problems of police abuse and racism there are already, and 
creates the circumstances in which mutual misunderstanding, unanticipated reactions, and 
nervousness on both sides, lead to tragedy.17  
 
 In short, one of the problems with profiling is that you do not need to suppose that the 
police are especially racist or brutish to worry about innocent civilian deaths: you simply have to 
suppose that if police believe that they are facing a potentially dangerous criminal, then they are 
far more likely to anticipate the lethal use of force, and to respond in kind, than would 
otherwise be the case.  Hence, I suspect that police abuse and the disproportionate use of race 
in profiling are not as readily classed as expressive harms of profiling as Risse believe.  
 
 Nor am I as confident as Risse that whites would find the profiling of whites 
unobjectionable, simply because they do not suffer, and do not expect to suffer, from racism. 
Here, I think, Risse misstates the relevant question we should ask for his thought-experiment.  
According to Risse, what we need to know is whether white people would object to being 
classed as white people, and so identified as a group, rather than as individuals, for police 
purposes: “…in some cases people do mind being treated in terms of a group-membership and 
in others they do not, and which is which depends on the social esteem in which that 
membership is being held” (Risse, 24)   Hence, Risse believes that whites would not  object to 
being classed as white people.  I see no reason to disagree.  But it does not follow from that that 
they would not object to the profiling of white people.  The reason to profile white people, 
presumably, is because white people are thought to be more prone to crime - at least in some 
cases - than are non-white people.  So, the relevant question isn’t “do you object to being 
classed as white?” but “do you mind being classed as a member of a group who the police 
believe to be particularly prone to crime?”   
 
This question, I suspect, would have a very different response.  Most of us do not like 
the idea of being mistaken for criminals, or incipient criminals, however remotely.18  Nor do 
most people like the idea of being subject to stops and searches at the discretion of the police.  
Our dislike of being profiled might be allayed by knowing that it serves a useful police purpose, 
                                                 
17 For more details see Lever,  pp. 103-4 
18 For some suggestive evidence see Lever, 101-3 
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but it might not.  We might still detest and fear it, even if we have to put up with it – and, 
perhaps, even if we agree that we should put up with it.  
 
  So, unfortunately, I do not find R’s thought experiment has the effect on me that it has 
on him. This is partly because we disagree about the relevant question to ask in the thought 
experiment.  But it may be, as well, that we simply have different intuitions here, as in other 
matters. Although we both agree that racial inequality and injustice remain a problem in 
America, and one that cannot be resolved overnight,19 we disagree about what this implies for 
racial profiling.  For Risse, it makes it likely that many of the harms attributed to racial profiling 
are properly blamed on background racism.  This means, he thinks, that profiling might well be 
justified as a normal part of police practice.  In my view, it means that whatever harms we 
attribute to racial profiling require more justification than would otherwise be the case, because 
of the risk of compounding injustice. Hence, I believe that racial profiling will generally be 
unjustified, because it is far from clear that its harms are trivial or that those harms, whatever 
they are, are outweighed by the benefits.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
 How should the harms of racism figure in our evaluation of the harms of racial profiling?  
According to Risse and Zeckhauser, they figure as the background against which we determine 
what they call the incremental harm of racial profiling (RZ, 149).  By incremental harm, they 
mean the harms specific to racial profiling that racial profiling will add to whatever harms 
                                                 
19 Prof. Levin clearly thinks that I overestimate the problems of racism in the contemporary US.  However, 
Risse’s argument is predicated on a similar assumption, for which there is considerable evidence.  First, 
despite Levin’s suggestion that racism essentially ends in the 1930s, it was only in the 1960s that many 
forms of legalized inferiority, such as anti-miscegenation laws, were struck down by the Supreme Court.  
Nor is it credible that the effects of legalized segregation, and the battles to retain it, ceased to affect people 
of both races in the 1970s and ‘80s.  For myself, I simply cannot understand how white indifference to the 
appalling poverty, lack of opportunity, violence and ill-health suffered by black people can be explained 
without supposing some residues of racial prejudice, nor do I see how else to explain the astonishingly 
punitive attention to young black men and women, when indifference or denial are no longer options. As 
Bruce Western says, ‘despite the end of welfare as we knew it, government had not withdrawn from the 
lives of America’s poor: its role had simply changed.  More punitive than limited, government had reached 
deeply into poor urban communities by sending record numbers of young men to prison and jail at a time 
when crime rates were at their lowest levels in thirty years”.  See Bruce Western, Punishment and 
Inequality in America, (Russel Sage Foundation, New York, 2006), (Preface, xi).  For some of the story as 
regards black women, see Dorothy Roberts, Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction and the Meaning 
of Liberty, (Pantheon Books, New York, 1997). 
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already exist as a result of racism in society.  Hence, Risse and Zeckhauser’s disagreement with 
Kennedy: for from their perspective Kennedy fails to see that most of the harms that he 
attributes to racial profiling are really due to background racism. (Risse15).  Background racism 
figures in their justification of profiling, however, simply as the backdrop against which the 
incremental costs and benefits of profiling are to be identified, and has no distinctive role of its 
own in assessing those harms and benefits.  Thus, Risse and Zeckhauser’s approach to the 
justification of racial profiling differs both from Kennedy’s and from mine, because on their 
view, the harms of racism – whether or not they occur via profiling – tell us nothing about the 
weight we should assign to the harms and benefits of profiling.  
 
 This strikes me as odd, because Risse and Zeckhauser do not seem to think that racism is 
ethically neutral.  On the contrary, they clearly believe we should do what we can (consistent 
with various ethical constraints), to remove it and to minimize or alleviate its harms. Yet this 
belief has no relevance to the way we assess the harms specific to racial profiling on their view.   
 
 I find this problematic, as well as puzzling. However we describe the harms of profiling 
black people, it is clear that they fall largely on black people – young black men, predominantly, 
but not exclusively.  But this is a group who are already likely to suffer the harms of living in a 
racist society.  So, even if they share in some of the benefits of profiling, (because young black 
men are likely to harm each other, and not only other people), we need to know whether those 
benefits are able to justify the harms of profiling, given that the latter are likely to compound 
harms that they already suffer, unjustifiably, because of racism.20  
 
  My sense is that they will not, and probably cannot in most circumstances, because we 
already find it hard enough to know how to combat racial inequalities and inequities without the 
risk that we might compound them and make them harder to address. Moreover, it is likely that 
background racism makes the harms of profiling – whatever they are – harder to bear than they 
                                                 
20 For all racial and ethnic groups, “the probability of violence accelerates in early adolescence…reaching a 
peak between the ages of 17 and 18 and then declining precipitously thereafter”.  Such very young ages 
may be specific to the Chicago neighbourhoods that are the focus of this study.  Nevertheless, they 
highlight one especially troubling aspect of the crime wave in America – that many of its victims and 
perpetrators are children and teenagers, and too young legally to vote, drink, marry or even to drive a car. 
Indeed, many of its victims and perpetrators ought, by law, to be attending school. See Sampson et al. 
p.229 
 
 15 
otherwise would be. For both of these reasons, then, I think background racism affects the way 
that we assess the harms of profiling – and does so by raising the barriers to successful 
justification.21  
 
 Conceivably those barriers could be overcome. But I doubt that that will be true in most 
circumstances, both because of the difficulties in justifying prospective profiling in general, and 
because of the difficulties specific to racial profiling itself.22 Of course, a fair bit turns on how 
bad you think racism is in our societies, and on what forms of profiling one is talking about.  In 
the earlier paper, I argued that Risse and Zeckhauser underestimated the incremental harms of 
profiling, and R has conceded that that might have been true. 23 Whether or not it is, however, 
one does not have to be indifferent to the harms of crime to believe that racism makes most 
forms of racial profiling unjust.  One merely needs to doubt that the benefits of racial profiling, 
                                                 
21 In response to Prof. Levin’s comments I should note that I do not believe Risse and I are talking past 
each other, despite our disagreements.  I believe, as Risse apparently does not, that for black people the 
intrinsic and incremental harms  (or, on Levin’s terminology, the marginal harm) of profiling are 
inseparable because the profiling of black people inevitably takes place against a background of racial 
subordination and discrimination that Risse and I both assume exists.  I am not sure if there is an 
incremental harm of profiling for white people in the sense that Risse and I both use the term, because it is 
not clear that there is any background prejudice or discrimination against white people that the profiling of 
whites might exacerbate – at all events, Risse’s examples turn on us supposing that no such background 
discrimination exists; hence no increment of background harm can be produced by the intrinsic harm of 
profiling, whatever one takes that to be.  
 Moreover, while I agree with Levin that Risse overstates the problems created by counting 
expressive harms in the harms of profiling, as Kennedy does, I agree with Risse that it would be a gain in 
clarity if we could distinguish the expressive and non-expressive harms of profiling, and I agree that we 
might gain greater clarity if we focused our disagreements about the justification of profiling on the latter 
alone – at least in the first instance. However, I am sceptical that we will be able to make the relevant 
distinctions most of the time.  More specifically, I have tried to show here, and in my original paper, that 
background racism must still figure in our assessment of profiling, even if we accept the EHT.  This is 
because we have duties to remove unjustified inequalities, and not to exacerbate those we cannot remove.  
These duties – which Risse assumes to exist as well - affect the weight we should assign to the harms of 
profiling whatever we take the relevant harms to be.  
22 Prof. Levin evidently believes that black people are particularly prone to violence, and that the reason for 
this is genetic.  It is therefore important to note that while Sampson et al. agree that “high impulsivity 
increases the risk of violence”, they find that this has little explanatory weight when considering racial and 
ethnic disparities in rates of violence.  “Despite their significant associations with violence, the main 
finding is that verbal/reading ability and impulsivity explain a relatively small fraction of the gap between 
Blacks and whites….Also, verbal/reading ability and impulsivity have no bearing on the gap between 
Mexican Americans and Whites, which remains virtually unchanged.  Therefore, constitutional factors are 
significant predictors of violence but weak explainers of racial/ethnic disparities in violence”. Sampson et 
al., p.229, emphasis in text. Indeed, it seems that “one reason Whites have lower levels of violence than 
Blacks is that Whites are more likely to be recent immigrants”, and while Mexican Americans in the first 
generation are less prone to violence than are Whites, by the third generation their risk is slightly higher.  
23 Risse 18, and to Lever, 103-8. 
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compared to alternative police tactics and social policies, will generally offset its costs once we 
account for the burdens that racism unjustifiably places on black people.  
 
 So, I conclude that racial profiling cannot be justified as a normal part of police practice, 
although in exceptional circumstances it might be allowed.  Concern for people’s lives, liberties 
and rights impinge on the means we may use to catch criminals, and to prevent crime before it 
takes place. Racial profiling, I would argue, is merely one more example of this familiar principle.   
 
 Prohibitions on the general use of racial profiling do not imply that we should be 
indifferent to crime – to the demands of efficiency or to the demands of deterrence.  Nor do 
other familiar legal requirements, such as that police must inform those they arrest that they 
have rights to remain silent, and to use a lawyer.  Some of the people that these legal 
requirements are designed to protect are, themselves, a threat to the rights of others; and the 
rights that we safeguard for them may, on occasion, enable them to evade arrest or conviction 
for their crimes. However, rights and civil liberties are designed to protect the interests of 
people who live in a world much like our own.  This means that rights have to protect the guilty 
as well as the innocent and, on occasion, the line between the one and the other will be thin, 
indeed.  
 
 
